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AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
 Gregory Garrett Brown appeals the decision of the 
District Court enhancing his sentence on a finding that he is a 
career offender.  For that finding, the Court followed the 
approach set out by our Court in United States v. Mahone, 
662 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2011).  Brown contends the Supreme 
Court’s decision in Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 
2276 (2013), overrules Mahone.  At issue is how far beyond 
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the literal words of a criminal statute a judge may inquire to 
find that a prior conviction qualifies for the career offender 
enhancement. 
I. Background 
 In 2010, while serving time in state custody for 
another offense, Brown mailed a threatening letter to 
Magistrate Judge Susan Baxter.  Judge Baxter presided over 
the earlier dismissal of Brown’s habeas petition.  In the letter, 
Brown intimated that upon his release from custody he 
planned to kill Judge Baxter and former District Judge Sean 
McLaughlin.  Following an investigation, Brown pled guilty 
to mailing a threatening communication in violation of 
18 U.S.C. § 876(c). 
 A presentence investigation report (“PSR”) 
recommended, among other things, that Brown be sentenced 
pursuant to the career offender enhancement in the United 
States Sentencing Guidelines.  That enhancement applies to a 
defendant convicted under § 876(c) if he has “at least two 
prior felony convictions of either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  The 
PSR’s recommendation was based on four prior offenses in 
Brown’s criminal history: (1) a 1986 conviction for 
aggravated assault, in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2702; 
(2) a 2004 conviction for making terroristic threats, in 
violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706; (3) a 2005 conviction 
also for making terroristic threats, in violation of § 2706; and 
(4) a 2005 conviction for retaliating against a judicial officer, 
in violation of 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 4953.1.  The two 2005 
convictions arose from the same conduct. 
 A pair of concessions by the parties limited the dispute 
at sentencing and similarly limits the breadth of our review on 
appeal:  Brown concedes that his 1986 conviction qualifies as 
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a crime of violence for purposes of the enhancement, and the 
Government does not contend that the 2005 retaliation 
conviction so qualifies.  Thus the parties’ arguments at 
sentencing focused on whether either of Brown’s two 
convictions for making terroristic threats in violation of 
§ 2706 counted as qualifying (called predicate) offenses for 
purposes of the enhancement.   
 The definitional part of the Pennsylvania statute 
divides violations into three categories, only the first of 
which—§ 2706(a)(1)—can be a predicate offense.  That 
Brown’s convictions, the Government contended, were 
predicate offenses was conclusively decided by an earlier 
case, United States v. Mahone, 662 F.3d 651 (3d Cir. 2011), 
which held that some, but not all, violations of subsection 
(a)(1) were predicate offenses and that a sentencing judge 
may inquire further to determine if the facts of a prior 
conviction qualified.  Among other arguments, Brown 
countered that Mahone is no longer controlling in light of 
Descamps v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 2276 (2013), in which 
the Supreme Court held that a sentencing court may not look 
to the facts underlying a prior conviction but instead must 
look to its elements. 
 Before the sentencing hearing, Judge Cohill issued 
tentative findings rejecting Brown’s argument.  Relying on 
Mahone, he concluded that a violation of subsection (a)(1) 
was a crime of violence (thus a predicate offense under the 
Guidelines) and that the documents underlying Brown’s 
conviction demonstrated that he was convicted under that 
subsection in 2004.  He also determined that the 2005 
terroristic threats conviction did not qualify as a predicate 
offense because the documents supporting that conviction did 
not definitively establish under which subsection of the 
statute Brown was convicted.  Addressing the effect of 
Descamps, Judge Cohill explained that Mahone was at most 
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“overruled in its analysis of the FACTS of the case for 
making a determination of career offender, not the case’s 
determination of (a)(1) as a crime of violence.”  App. at 10 
n.5 (emphasis in original).  He thus applied the career 
offender enhancement based on Brown’s 1986 aggravated 
assault conviction and his 2004 terroristic threats conviction.  
The enhancement raised Brown’s offense level and his 
criminal history category, more than doubling his 
recommended Guidelines’ sentence from 30-37 months to 77-
96 months.  The Court sentenced Brown to 84 months’ 
imprisonment.  This timely appeal followed. 
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review  
 The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 
U.S.C. § 3231.  We exercise appellate jurisdiction under 28 
U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742.  “Whether a prior 
conviction constitutes a crime of violence for purposes of the 
career offender Guideline is a question of law over which we 
exercise plenary review.”  United States v. Marrero, 743 F.3d 
389, 393 (3d Cir. 2014). 
III. Discussion 
 On appeal, Brown contends that the career offender 
enhancement did not apply to him because he has only one 
predicate “crime of violence” in his criminal history (the 1986 
aggravated assault conviction) and the Guidelines require two 
predicate offenses for the enhancement to apply.  The 
Government responds that either the 2004 or the 2005 
terroristic threats conviction supplies the necessary second 
predicate offense.  Brown asserts that his convictions under 
the Pennsylvania terroristic threats statute are not “crimes of 
violence” as defined by the Guidelines.   
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 We conclude that, in light of the Supreme Court’s 
explanation in Descamps, Brown’s convictions under 18 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 2706 are not “crimes of violence” for purposes 
of the Guidelines’ career offender enhancement.  In effect, 
Descamps abrogated the portion of Mahone that held 
otherwise. 
 A. The Career Offender Enhancement 
 Under the Guidelines, the career offender enhancement 
applies to a defendant if: 
(1) [he] was at least eighteen years old at the 
time [he] committed the instant offense of 
conviction; (2) the instant offense of conviction 
is a felony that is either a crime of violence or a 
controlled substance offense; and (3) [he] has at 
least two prior felony convictions of either a 
crime of violence or a controlled substance 
offense. 
U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(a).  The issue here is the third criterion—
whether the 2004 (or 2005) conviction is a “crime of 
violence.”  How we go about deciding that issue, and what we 
can consider in doing so, takes up much of what follows.   
 The Guidelines define a “crime of violence” in 
relevant part as any crime punishable by more than a year of 
imprisonment that “has as an element the use, attempted use, 
or threatened use of physical force against the person of 
another.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1).1  Sentencing courts 
                                              
1
 A prior conviction may also be a “crime of violence” if it “is 
burglary of a dwelling, arson, or extortion, involves use of 
explosives, or otherwise involves conduct that presents a 
serious potential risk of physical injury to another.”  U.S.S.G. 
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examining a prior conviction to determine whether it is a 
federally defined “crime of violence” must apply a 
categorical approach.  United States v. Abbott, 748 F.3d 154, 
157 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283).
2
  
Under this approach sentencing courts “compare the elements 
                                                                                                     
§ 4B1.2(a)(2).  This category, which has an analog in the 
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), see 18 U.S.C. 
§ 924(e)(2)(B)(ii), is sometimes referred to as the list of 
“generic crimes” or “generic offenses.”  See Descamps, 133 
S. Ct. at 2282.  Nothing in § 4B1.2(a)(2) states that a threat to 
commit a generic crime is itself a “crime of violence,” and the 
Government has never argued that Brown’s § 2706 
convictions fall under § 4B1.2(a)(2). 
 
2
 Although Abbott and Descamps involved sentencing 
enhancements under the ACCA, rather than the career 
offender enhancement in the Guidelines, they nonetheless 
bind our analysis.  “Precedent . . . requires the application of 
case law interpreting ‘violent felony’ in [the] ACCA to ‘crime 
of violence’ in U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2[ ] because of the substantial 
similarity of the two sections.”  Marerro, 743 F.3d at 394 n.2 
(second alteration added) (internal quotation marks and 
citation omitted).  See also United States v. Hopkins, 577 F.3d 
507, 511 (3d Cir. 2009) (“[T]he definition of a violent felony 
under the ACCA is sufficiently similar to the definition of a 
crime of violence under the Sentencing Guidelines that 
authority interpreting one is generally applied to the 
other . . . .”).  Both before and after Descamps we have 
consistently applied the categorical approach to 
determinations under the career offender enhancement.  
Compare United States v. Stinson, 592 F.3d 460, 462 (3d Cir. 
2010), with Marrero, 743 F.3d at 395, and United States v. 
Jones, 740 F.3d 127, 133 (3d Cir. 2014). 
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of the statute forming the basis of the defendant’s conviction 
with the elements of the ‘generic’ crime—i.e., the offense as 
commonly understood.  The prior conviction qualifies as an 
ACCA predicate only if the statute’s elements are the same 
as, or narrower than, those of the generic offense.”  
Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2281.  In practice, courts “may ‘look 
only to the statutory definitions’—i.e., the elements—of a 
defendant’s prior offenses, and not ‘to the particular facts 
underlying those convictions.’”  Id. at 2283 (emphasis in 
original) (quoting Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 600 
(1990)).  In the ordinary case of identifying whether a prior 
conviction fits the § 4B1.2(a)(1) definition, a court simply 
asks “whether the state crime has the use or threat of physical 
force [against the person of another] as an element of the 
offense.”  United States v. Remoi, 404 F.3d 789, 794 (3d Cir. 
2005) (internal quotation marks omitted).  If the state statute 
“sweeps more broadly” than the federal definition, a 
conviction under it is not a career offender predicate even if 
the defendant actually committed the offense in a way that 
involved the use (or threatened use) of physical force against 
another.  See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2283 (explaining that a 
defendant convicted of a burglary statute that “sweeps more 
broadly” than the ACCA’s generic burglary offense is not 
subject to the enhancement “even if the defendant actually 
committed the offense in its generic form”). 
 However, there is a “narrow range of cases” whereby a 
court can look beyond the fact of conviction and examine 
certain record evidence from the conviction to determine 
whether the prior offense is a crime of violence.  Taylor, 495 
U.S. at 602.  In Descamps, the Supreme Court explained that 
when a statute is “divisible”— i.e., “comprises multiple, 
alternative versions of the crime”—a sentencing court may 
look to a limited class of extra-statutory documents to 
determine which version of the offense was the basis of 
conviction.  133 S. Ct. at 2284.  This is known as the 
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“modified categorical approach.”  Id. at 2283.   Under this 
approach, if a statute is divisible, a court may consult “the 
charging paper and jury instructions” when the conviction 
resulted from a jury trial, Taylor, 495 U.S. at 602, or, when 
the conviction resulted from a guilty plea, “the charging 
document, written plea agreement, transcript of plea colloquy, 
and any explicit factual finding by the trial judge to which the 
defendant assented.”  Shepard v. United States, 544 U.S. 13, 
16 (2005).  The modified categorical approach still “retains 
the categorical approach’s central feature: a focus on the 
elements, rather than the facts, of a crime.”  Descamps, 133 S. 
Ct. at 2285.  It simply allows a sentencing court “to examine 
a limited class of documents to determine which of a statute’s 
alternative elements formed the basis of the defendant’s prior 
conviction.”  Id. at 2284 (emphasis added).   
 It bears repeating that the modified categorical 
approach is “applicable only to divisible statutes.”  Id.; 
accord id. at 2285 (“[T]he modified approach merely helps 
implement the categorical approach when a defendant was 
convicted of violating a divisible statute.”).  In Descamps, for 
example, the Supreme Court held that the modified approach 
could not be applied to the California burglary statute at issue 
because it had a “single, indivisible set of elements.”  Id. at 
2282.  To explain the difference between a divisible and 
indivisible statute, and why the modified categorical approach 
may be used only with the former, the Court imagined a 
hypothetical assault statute that simply required the “use of a 
‘weapon,’” as opposed to a specific list of weapons.  Id. at 
2289 (internal quotation marks omitted).  Including a 
“weapon” as an element of the crime makes the statute 
indivisible because it creates only an “implied list” of the 
ways the offense may be committed rather than an explicit list 
of ways to commit the crime.  Id. (emphasis in original).  A 
sentencing court should not examine extra-statutory 
documents (such as a charging document or guilty plea) and 
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find that a defendant committed a predicate gun crime based 
on a conviction under such an indivisible statute because, 
[a]s long as the statute itself requires only an 
indeterminate “weapon,” that is all the 
indictment must (or is likely to) allege and all 
the jury instructions must (or are likely to) 
mention.  And most important, that is all the 
jury must find to convict the defendant.  The 
jurors need not all agree on whether the 
defendant used a gun or a knife or a tire iron (or 
any other particular weapon that might appear 
in an imagined divisible statute), because the 
actual statute requires the jury to find only a 
“weapon.”  And even if in many cases[] the jury 
could have readily reached consensus on the 
weapon used, a later sentencing court cannot 
supply that missing judgment.  Whatever the 
underlying facts or the evidence presented, the 
defendant still would not have been convicted, 
in the deliberate and considered way the 
Constitution guarantees, of an offense with the 
same (or narrower) elements as the supposed 
generic crime (assault with a gun). 
Id. at 2290. 
 By contrast, a statute is “divisible” when it “list[s] 
potential offense elements in the alternative.”  Id. at 2283.  
For example, continuing with the Supreme Court’s 
hypothetical, it considered for analysis an assault statute that 
prohibits assault with a “gun, axe, sword, baton, slingshot, 
knife, machete, bat,” “grenade[], pipe bomb[], spear[], tire 
iron[], BB gun[], nunchucks, [or] crossbow[].”  Id. at 2289-90 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  Under such a statute, if 
assault with a gun is categorically (that is, always) a predicate 
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offense, then a sentencing court may examine the documents 
underlying a defendant’s conviction to see whether he was 
charged with and convicted of using a gun.  Id. at 2290.   
 Furthermore, a sentencing court should apply the 
modified approach to a divisible statute and examine extra-
statutory documents only when “at least one, but not all” of 
the separate versions of the offense is, by its elements, a 
predicate offense.  Id. at 2285.  As the Fourth Circuit has 
explained, “[g]eneral divisibility . . . is not enough; a statute is 
divisible for purposes of applying the modified categorical 
approach only if at least one of the categories into which the 
statute may be divided constitutes, by its elements, a crime of 
violence.”  United States v. Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d 347, 
352 (4th Cir. 2013) (emphasis in original) (citing Descamps, 
133 S. Ct. at 2285). 
 The modified categorical approach is perhaps best 
explained by a generic example.  Imagine a defendant 
previously convicted for violating Statute X.  In considering 
whether that prior conviction is a predicate offense, a 
sentencing should first determine whether a violation of X is, 
no matter the circumstances of the particular crime, always a 
crime of violence.  If so, it is a predicate offense under the 
regular categorical approach and there is no need to analyze 
the statute any further.  If, on the other hand, the court 
determines that X is overbroad (i.e., it covers some conduct 
that is a crime of violence and some that is not), the court 
should then inquire whether X is divisible.   If the court 
determines that X is generally divisible into, say, three 
versions of the offense—subsections a, b and c—it should 
next determine whether any of these subsections (for 
example, X(a)) is, by its particular elements, always a 
federally defined crime of violence.  If so, then the court may 
apply the modified categorical approach to determine whether 
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the defendant was convicted under X(a).  That is the typical 
way in which the modified categorical approach operates. 
 This case probes how far the modified categorical 
approach logically extends if a statute is divisible into 
subparts but no version of the offense (a, b or c) is in all 
circumstances a crime of violence.  May a sentencing court 
nonetheless look to extra-statutory documents to see whether 
the particular offense a defendant committed was a crime of 
violence?  Or must the Court halt its analysis and find that the 
conviction is not a predicate offense?  Descamps, which took 
a hard line on how the modified categorical approach 
operates, requires the latter.  If a statute is generally divisible 
into multiple versions, but each version is overbroad (covers 
at least some conduct that is not a crime of violence) and 
indivisible (cannot be further divided into sub-versions based 
on the elements), the extra-statutory documents are irrelevant 
and a sentencing court’s analysis has reached a dead-end: the 
prior conviction is not a predicate offense.  See Descamps, 
133 S. Ct. at 2283.   
 We now turn to the particular statute—the 
Pennsylvania terroristic threats statute, 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 2706—underlying Brown’s 2004 and 2005 convictions.   
 B. The Terroristic Threats Statute 
 Descamps instructs that we focus on the elements of 
the offense rather than Brown’s particular conduct in 
committing the offense.  Section 2706 prohibits  
communicat[ing], either directly or indirectly, a threat 
to: 
(1) commit any crime of violence with 
intent to terrorize another; 
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(2) cause evacuation of a building, place 
of assembly or facility of public 
transportation; or 
(3) otherwise cause serious public 
inconvenience, or cause terror or serious 
public inconvenience with reckless 
disregard of the risk of causing such 
terror or inconvenience. 
18 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 2706(a). 
 Because § 2706(a) is phrased in the disjunctive—
“describing three variations of the same offense”—the statute 
is divisible into subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), Mahone, 
662 F.3d at 654,
3
 and we apply the modified categorical 
approach to discern which of the three versions of the offense 
a defendant was convicted of if at least one of the versions by 
its elements is a crime of violence in all instances. Descamps, 
133 S. Ct. at 2285.  The provision “encompasses some crimes 
that could be committed by using, attempting to use, or 
threatening to use ‘physical force against the person of 
another,’ as well as against another person’s property.”  
Mahone, 662 F.3d at 653 (emphasis in original).  Crimes 
threatened, attempted, or committed against the person of 
another may fit the applicable Guidelines’ definition of a 
“crime of violence”—“the use, attempted use, or threatened 
use of physical force against the person of another,” U.S.S.G. 
§ 4B1.2(a)(1)—while crimes against property do not.  Id.  
Subsection (a)(1) is thus the only version of the offense that 
                                              
3
 We cite to Mahone frequently in our analysis of § 2706 even 
though Descamps supersedes it.  We do so because, as 
explained below, Mahone was abrogated only in part.  Thus 
much of its analysis of the Pennsylvania terroristic threat 
statute still guides our analysis here. 
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potentially qualifies as a “crime of violence” because only it 
may involve an intentional threat to use force against a 
person.  Id. at 654-55.   
 But a determination that a defendant was previously 
convicted under § 2706(a)(1) does not end the inquiry.  The 
subsection prohibits threatening to “commit any crime of 
violence with intent to terrorize another,” yet it does not 
define what is a “crime of violence.”  Though we might think 
Pennsylvania’s definition matches the definition in the 
Guidelines, thereby making any violation of § 2706(a)(1) a 
predicate offense, we cannot conclude that without further 
application of the categorical approach.  See Mahone, 662 
F.3d at 655 (“We cannot conclude at this step in our analysis 
that the statutory variation in § 2706(a)(1) categorically 
qualifies as a [crime of violence] . . . because this variation of 
the statute contains the undefined term ‘crime of violence.’”).   
 As we observed in Mahone, another Pennsylvania 
statute defines a “crime of violence” for purposes of 
sentencing.  42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 9714(g); Mahone, 662 F.3d 
at 655 (citing United States v. Ortiz-Gomez, 562 F.3d 683, 
685-86 (5th Cir. 2009)).  Included within that definition is a 
version of arson that does not necessarily “ha[ve] as an 
element the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical 
force against the person of another.”  U.S.S.G. § 4B1.2(a)(1); 
see Ortiz-Gomez, 562 F.3d at 686 (citing 18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§§ 3301(a)(1) and 9714(g)) (observing that in Pennsylvania 
arson can be committed by “start[ing] a fire for the purpose of 
damaging a structure . . . regardless of whether a person is 
present”).  Because in Pennsylvania arson can exist 
“regardless of whether a person is present,” that crime would 
not be included in the Guidelines’ definition of a “crime of 
violence.”  Mahone, 662 F.3d at 655-56 (quoting Ortiz-
Gomez, 562 F.3d at 686).  Hence a threat to commit arson 
with intent to terrorize another—a violation of § 2706(a)(1)—
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would not be a predicate offense under § 4B1.2(a) of the 
Guidelines.  Id. at 655-56.
4
   
 A violation of § 2706(a)(1) thus may sometimes be a 
“crime of violence” as defined by the Guidelines (for 
example, threatening to commit murder) and sometimes not 
(for example, threatening to commit arson).  See id. at 656.  
Moreover, unlike the hypothetical assault statute from 
Descamps that listed each type of weapon, § 2706(a)(1) does 
not list each crime of violence, and thus it is also indivisible.  
See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2290.  Because the 
categorization of a § 2706 offense depends on a fact 
underlying the conviction (the crime the defendant 
threatened) that is not an element of the offense, Descamps 
instructs that the statute is overbroad and indivisible as to 
(a)(1) and thus fails as a predicate offense under the 
categorical approach.  See 133 S. Ct. at 2281-82 (prohibiting 
a court from looking to an offender’s underlying conduct to 
determine that a prior conviction qualifies as a predicate 
offense when “the elements of the crime fail to satisfy [the] 
categorical test”).  The Supreme Court unambiguously 
rejected this so-called “modified factual” approach.  Id. at 
2287 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).  It 
explained that the problem is that this approach “asks not 
whether ‘statutory definitions’ necessarily require an 
adjudicator to find [a crime of violence], but instead whether 
the prosecutor’s case realistically led the adjudicator to make 
that determination.”  Id.   
                                              
4
 One might wonder why a threat to commit arson does not 
qualify as a predicate offense under § 4B1.2(a)(2) of the 
Guidelines.  See supra note 1.  The Government has never 
argued that it does, perhaps because subsection (a)(2) covers 
the offense of arson, not the threat to commit arson. 
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 Mahone, which was decided before Descamps, applied 
precisely the sort of “modified factual” approach the Supreme 
Court has since disavowed.  In Mahone, the criminal record 
of the defendant included a conviction under a nearly 
identical predecessor to the current Pennsylvania terroristic 
threats statute.  662 F.3d at 653.  He was charged with 
“threaten[ing] to commit the violent crime of criminal 
homicide with intent to terrorize [the victim].”  Id. at 656.  
The plea colloquy’s factual recitation included the allegation 
that Mahone threatened to kill the victim, which he admitted 
by pleading guilty.  Id.   
 Mahone appealed the sentencing judge’s application of 
the enhancement, and we affirmed.  Id. at 652.  We concluded 
that, although subsection (a)(1) covered some conduct that 
would not be a “crime of violence” under the Guidelines, 
because Mahone was in fact charged with, and thus convicted 
of, threatening a federally defined “crime of violence,” 
criminal homicide, his § 2706 conviction qualified as a 
predicate offense under the career offender enhancement.  Id. 
at 657.   
 Descamps overrode that conclusion.  Like the burglary 
statute there that criminalized simple shoplifting and 
“define[d] burglary more broadly than the generic offense” 
under the ACCA, 133 S. Ct. at 2285 (internal quotation marks 
omitted), we now hold that § 2706(a)(1) is overbroad in that it 
criminalizes conduct that is not always considered a federally 
defined “crime of violence.”  Hence a violation of the statute 
is categorically not a predicate offense for purposes of the 
career offender enhancement.  See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 
2283 (“[I]f the statute sweeps more broadly than the generic 
crime, a conviction under that law cannot count as an ACCA 
predicate, even if the defendant actually committed the 
offense in its generic form.”).  Descamps thus supersedes the 
portion of Mahone that held otherwise. 
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C. Application of the Career Offender 
Enhancement to Brown 
 Returning to our case, the District Court, relying on 
Mahone, analyzed the facts underlying Brown’s conviction, 
rather than focusing on the legal elements of the alleged 
predicate offense, to determine that Brown’s 2004 terroristic 
threats conviction qualified for the career offender 
enhancement.  No doubt, given the facts surrounding Brown’s 
2004 and 2005 convictions, they would appear to be “crimes 
of violence” to a layperson.  The PSR explains that in 2004 
Brown repeatedly threatened to harm two correctional 
officers at the Erie County Prison, including threats to murder 
the officers.  The charging document for the 2004 offense 
alleges that Brown stated, among other things, “When I get 
out of here, I’m gonna murder you bitch.”  In 2005, much like 
the current offense of conviction, Brown apparently sent a 
letter to a state court judge in Erie, Pennsylvania, in which he 
threatened to kill the judge. 
 But Descamps rejects that approach; the factual 
circumstances of the conviction are not what matter, the key 
is the elements of the crime.  As we explained above and in 
Mahone, subsection (a)(1) of the Pennsylvania terroristic 
threats statute (the subsection under which Brown concedes 
he was convicted) is overbroad because, in using the 
undefined term “crime of violence,” it covers at least one 
factual circumstance—threatening to commit arson—that 
does not meet the Guidelines’ definition of a “crime of 
violence.”  “The modified [categorical] approach . . . has no 
role to play[,]”  Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285, because no 
single subsection of § 2706, by its elements, can be 
categorized exclusively as a crime of violence and thus may 
not qualify as a predicate offense for the enhancement.   
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 Other Circuit Courts that have examined a statute that 
contains multiple versions of an offense, none of which is 
categorically a crime of violence by its elements, have 
similarly concluded that the modified categorical approach 
does not apply to those statutes.  In Cabrera-Umanzor, the 
Fourth Circuit was faced with a Maryland child abuse statute 
that was “generally divisible” into two categories:  physical 
abuse and sexual abuse.  728 F.3d at 352 (emphasis in 
original).  The plea agreement demonstrated that the 
defendant was convicted of committing sexual abuse, but that 
category “d[id] not, by its elements, constitute any of the 
potentially applicable crimes of violence enumerated in the 
Guidelines Commentary.”   Id. at 350, 352-53.  The Court 
concluded that the Maryland statute is “therefore not divisible 
in the manner necessary to warrant application of the 
modified categorical approach.”  Id. at 353.  Similarly, the 
Sixth Circuit, while examining a Tennessee robbery statute, 
applied Descamps’ categorical approach as follows:  
Descamps may give the false impression that 
the presence of a divisible statute of conviction 
alone confers on a court the ability to turn to 
certain approved, extra-statutory documents.  
However, that is not so.  The Supreme Court in 
Descamps, in analyzing a defendant’s 
conviction for burglary, repeated the caveat that 
“[o]ur decisions authorize review of the plea 
colloquy or other approved extra-statutory 
documents only when a statute defines burglary 
. . . alternatively, with one statutory phrase 
corresponding to the generic crime and another 
not.” 
United States v. Mitchell, 743 F.3d 1054, 1064 (6th Cir. 2014) 
(alteration and emphasis in original) (quoting Descamps, 133 
S. Ct. at 2286).  Finally, in United States v. Tucker, 740 F.3d 
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1177 (8th Cir. 2014) (en banc), the Eighth Circuit refused to 
apply the modified categorical approach to a Nebraska escape 
statute that criminalized certain types of escapes, only some 
of which qualified as predicate offenses, where the version of 
the offense of conviction was not, by its elements, a crime of 
violence.  See id. at 1182. 
 While the above speaks of other Circuits, the 
Government, as it should, cites to our recent decision in 
United States v. Blair, 734 F.3d 218 (3d Cir. 2013), and 
argues that, where a statute is divisible at some level (here, 
into subsections (a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3)), a sentencing court 
may look to the extra-statutory documents to identify not only 
the subsection of conviction but also to determine whether the 
particular circumstances of the offense within that subsection 
comprise a “crime of violence.”  See Gov’t Br. at 39-40 
(citing Blair, 734 F.3d at 224-25).  We agree that, at first 
blush, Blair appears to condone the analysis applied by the 
District Court here.  But a careful reading of that opinion, 
which dealt with a different statute (18 Pa. Cons. Stat. 
§ 3701), leads us to conclude that the portion of Blair on 
which the Government relies does not apply to our case. 
 Blair’s prior robbery convictions resulted in his 
sentence as a career offender under the ACCA.  On appeal we 
decided whether a robbery conviction in Pennsylvania  that 
did not reference the applicable subsection of the statute was 
a violent felony under the ACCA.  As here, three alternative 
versions of the offense were at issue.  We considered whether 
the modified categorical approach could be used to determine 
that Blair was convicted under the “least culpable” of those, 
§ 3701(a)(1)(iii).  Blair, 734 F.3d at 225-26.  That part of the 
statute makes it a crime in the course of a theft to “commit[ ] 
or threaten[ ] immediately to commit any felony of the first or 
second degree.” § 3701(a)(1)(iii).  Like Mahone and the 
District Court here, our Court concluded that Blair’s 
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conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA because the 
extra-statutory documents demonstrated that he committed or 
threatened to commit during the course of the theft an 
aggravated assault—a felony “in the first or second degree 
. . . [that] clearly involves violence.”  Id. at 222-23. 
 Blair argued, among other things, that though 
§ 3701(a)(1) as a whole is divisible into subsections (i), (ii), 
and (iii), the last, and applicable, subsection is not further 
divisible by the type of felony committed or threatened.  He 
contended (similar to Brown’s argument here) that 
§ 3701(a)(1)(iii) is overbroad and indivisible because “some 
felonies of the first and second degree involve no violence.”  
Id. at 225.  We assumed Blair was correct that the subsection 
was “indivisible and categorically overbroad,” yet rejected his 
argument.  Id.  We did so despite conceding that “Descamps 
makes it clear that if the relevant statute is indivisible . . . and 
. . . overbroad . . . , then the sentencing court cannot apply the 
modified categorical approach,”  id. at 224.  The Government 
seizes on the language rejecting Blair’s argument:  
There is no precedent for the argument that a 
sentencing court, having launched on the 
modified categorical approach, should stop 
when it gets to a statutory subsection and 
determine again whether to proceed with that 
approach and whether it can consider 
documents it has already reviewed. . . . [T]he 
documents that the District Court had reviewed 
as part of the modified categorical analysis 
plainly state that the felonies associated with 
[Blair’s] 1991 robbery convictions were 
“aggravated assault.”  The search for the 
applicable subsection in the relevant statute 
does not send the sentencing judge into a state 
of amnesia.  To shift the metaphor, the blinders 
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are already off, and there is no requirement to 
pretend otherwise. 
Id. at 225-26 (citation omitted); see also Gov’t Br. at 35-36.   
 Applying this logic to our case, the Government argues 
that, because § 2706(a) is broadly divisible into subsections 
(a)(1), (a)(2), and (a)(3), once the sentencing court looked to 
the charging document and jury instructions to determine 
under which of those three subsections Brown was convicted, 
it was also free to use those documents to determine whether 
the particular circumstances of Brown’s conviction under 
§ 2706(a)(1) fit the federal definition of a “crime of 
violence.”  Only in that way, the argument goes, are the 
blinders off. 
 Though one may question the correctness of the above 
excerpt in Blair as a general matter,
5
 it is distinguishable.  By 
                                              
5
 The issue primarily would involve Blair’s statement that a 
sentencing court can apply the modified categorical approach 
to a statutory subsection that is “indivisible and categorically 
overbroad.”  Blair, 734 F.3d at 225.  We understand the 
instinct that there is an unjust cost for looking away from the 
facts of that case.  In 1991, Blair pled guilty to four counts of 
first-degree robbery, in the process admitting that he 
committed or threatened to commit aggravated assault in the 
course of a theft.  Blair, 734 F.3d at 221, 226.  That certainly 
seems like a violent felony.  But Descamps instructs that it is 
the elements, not the facts, of a prior conviction that matter, 
see Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2287, and the elements in 
§ 3701(a)(1)(iii)—“any felony [in Pennsylvania] of the first 
or second degree”—include both felonies that are violent and 
those that are not.  As a result, sentencing judges, at least for 
subsections not divisible solely by looking at their written 
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its own terms, a make-believe “state of amnesia” confined 
only to textual elements does not apply where the sentencing 
court has already embarked on a permitted use of the 
modified categorical approach.  See Blair, 734 F.3d at 225 
(“There is no precedent for the argument that a sentencing 
court, having launched on the modified categorical approach, 
should stop when it gets to a statutory subsection and 
determine again whether to proceed with that approach and 
whether it can consider documents it has already reviewed.”); 
id. at 226 (“Descamps does not demand a recursive process 
wherein a district court that has already pursued the modified 
categorical approach in addressing a divisible statute is 
required to ignore the charging documents and guilty pleas it 
has just reviewed.”).  But where, as is our case, no version of 
a terroristic threats offense under § 2706(a) has elements that 
fit fully (that is, always) a crime of violence, a sentencing 
court may not use the modified categorical approach at all.  
See Descamps, 133 S. Ct. at 2285; Mahone, 662 F.3d at 654-
55; Cabrera-Umanzor, 728 F.3d at 352-53; Mitchell, 743 
F.3d at 1064.  Accordingly, the District Court could not apply 
the modified categorical approach in the first place and Blair 
does not control.   
IV. Conclusion 
 The Supreme Court’s concluding remarks in 
Descamps all but decide this case: “[The defendant] 
may . . . have broken and entered, and so committed generic 
burglary [under the ACCA].  But [the California burglary 
statute]—the crime of which he was convicted—does not 
                                                                                                     
elements, may look no further no matter how well they 
understand the actual facts contained in extra-statutory 
documents. 
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require the factfinder (whether jury or judge) to make that 
determination.”  133 S. Ct. at 2293.  So too here, Brown may 
have threatened to murder persons in 2004 and 2005 and so 
committed a “crime of violence.”  But § 2706(a)—the crime 
of which he was convicted—does not require the jury to make 
that determination. Thus the modified categorical approach 
has no permitted use.  Because this holding applies equally to 
the 2004 and 2005 terroristic threats convictions of Brown, 
and the Government does not argue that any other offense in 
his criminal history qualifies as a predicate offense, the career 
offender enhancement did not apply to him. 
 We make no comment on the correct sentence for 
Brown.  Under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the District Court has the 
discretion to fashion an appropriate sentence under the factors 
noted therein and in doing so is free to take into account his 
pattern of behavior over the years, including his conduct in 
2004 and 2005.  We hold only that, in light of the Supreme 
Court’s ruling in Descamps, the career offender enhancement 
is not available in this case.  We thus vacate Brown’s 
judgment of sentence and remand for resentencing. 
